The dispute over Preah Vihear

H2 History - syllabus 9174, 2027

What this lesson teaches

  • I can judge why tensions arose between Southeast Asian states and how they affected the region.

    Syllabus 9174, Paper 2, Theme III, Learning Outcomes. evaluate the causes and consequences of inter-state tensions on inter-state relations and the region

Make a guess

In 1962 the International Court of Justice gave the temple of Preah Vihear to Cambodia. Do you think this ended Thai-Cambodian tension?

  1. No, Thailand complied, but the dispute fuelled lasting hostility.
  2. Yes, both sides accepted it and became close friends.
  3. No, because Thailand refused to leave the temple.
Show the answer

No, Thailand complied, but the dispute fuelled lasting hostility.

To many Thais the colonial map had been imposed on Siam. The temple stayed a symbol of rivalry for decades.

Thailand and Cambodia both claimed an ancient temple on their border. The International Court of Justice gave it to Cambodia in 1962, but hostility lasted.

Preah Vihear is an ancient Khmer temple on a cliff along the Thai-Cambodian border. A 1904 treaty between Siam and France set the border there along the watershed, the line where rainwater divides.

When the French left in 1954, Thai forces occupied the temple. To Cambodians it was a symbol of their national heritage. To Thais, the border had been imposed on Siam by a colonial power.

Talks failed. In late 1958 Cambodia suspended diplomatic relations, accusing Thailand of occupying the temple and of massing troops on the border.

In 1959 Cambodia took the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN's court for disputes between states.

Cold War differences deepened the hostility. Thailand was an American ally, while Prince Sihanouk followed a neutral policy and accused Thailand of backing his enemies. Cambodia did not join ASEAN until 1999.

1904 and 1907
Franco-Siamese treaty; French map.
1958
Cambodia suspends relations with Thailand.
ICJ ruling
June 1962: the temple is Cambodian.

Real examples to use

Thailand's first reaction, June and July 1962

US records note that Prime Minister Sarit sent reinforcements to the area. Thailand also boycotted meetings of SEATO for a time, before it accepted the ruling.

Worked example: The ICJ judgment, 15 June 1962

Thailand argued that the watershed put the temple on its side. Cambodia relied on a French map that placed it in Cambodia.

  1. The map: French officers drew the map in 1907 and sent it to Siam in 1908. Siam's interior minister, Prince Damrong, thanked the French and asked for 15 more copies.
  2. The silence: in 1930 Prince Damrong visited the temple. A French official received him there, with the French flag flying. The Court said this "demanded a reaction. Thailand did nothing."
  3. The ruling: by nine votes to three, the Court found that the temple stood on Cambodian territory. Thailand had to withdraw its forces.
  4. Judgement: the Court decided by Siam's conduct over decades, not by the watershed. Thailand complied under protest, so ownership was settled but not the hostility.

Watch out for this

The ICJ ruling ended tensions between Thailand and Cambodia.

Thailand withdrew, but resentment remained, and relations between the two countries stayed poor for years.

Check your understanding

Why did the ICJ give the temple to Cambodia?

  1. Cambodia had the larger army on the border near the temple.
  2. Siam had accepted the 1907 map for decades without objecting.
  3. The UN Security Council voted for it.
Show the answer

Siam had accepted the 1907 map for decades without objecting.

Right. Its silence counted as acceptance.

Check your understanding

Why did a single temple matter so much to Thailand and Cambodia?

  1. It held oil and gas that both countries needed.
  2. It had become a symbol of national pride for both.
  3. It controlled the main road between the two capitals.
Show the answer

It had become a symbol of national pride for both.

Right. Losing it felt like losing part of the nation's heritage.

Sources and context

Background reading for this chapter.

  • An American estimate of the Malaysia plan

    Paraphrase of a US Special National Intelligence Estimate, "Prospects for Malaysia", 20 February 1963.

  • An American estimate of confrontation

    Paraphrase of a US National Intelligence Estimate, "The Malaysian-Indonesian Conflict", 30 October 1963.

  • Sukarno explains his position

    Paraphrase of a telegram from the US Ambassador in Jakarta, Howard Jones, reporting a conversation with President Sukarno, 10 April 1964.

  • Malaysia reacts to a Philippine plot over Sabah

    Paraphrase of an intelligence note from the US State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research to Secretary of State Rusk, 26 March 1968.

  • Cambodia explains its break with Thailand

    Paraphrase of a US State Department record of a conversation with the Cambodian Ambassador, Nong Kimny, 1 December 1958.

  • The separation agreement guarantees the water agreements

    Paraphrase of section 14 of the Malaysian act annexed to the agreement on the separation of Singapore from Malaysia, signed on 7 August 1965 and registered in the United Nations Treaty Series.

  • an American official on the Manila summit, August 1963

    Extract from a memorandum from Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Washington, 2 August 1963, written while the leaders of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines were meeting in Manila. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, volume XXIII, document 332. A US government document in the public domain.

  • Washington talks to General Nasution, December 1963

    Extract from a telegram from the State Department (signed by Secretary of State Rusk) to the US embassy in Indonesia, 7 December 1963, reporting talks in Washington with General Nasution, Indonesia's Defence Minister, during Konfrontasi. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, volume XXIII, document 324. A US government document in the public domain.

  • the President is briefed on the temple ruling, July 1962

    Extract from a memorandum from Carl Kaysen, deputy national security adviser, to President Kennedy, Washington, 12 July 1962, and the volume editors' note on it. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, volume XXIII, document 456. A US government publication in the public domain.

  • the State Department on Indonesia's new course, June 1966

    Extract from a State Department paper on Indonesia attached to a memorandum from Walt Rostow to President Johnson, Washington, 8 June 1966, a week after Indonesian and Malaysian delegations led by Adam Malik and Abdul Razak met in Bangkok. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, volume XXVI, document 210. A US government document in the public domain.

  • a cartoon about the Manila summit, August 1963

    An original cartoon drawn for these notes in the style of a regional newspaper cartoon published in August 1963, during and after the Manila summit of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines, which asked the UN Secretary-General to find out the wishes of the people of Sabah and Sarawak. It is not a copy of a real cartoon.

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