American escalation, 1961-1968

H1 History - syllabus 8838, 2027

What this lesson teaches

  • I can judge which factors shaped the Second and Third Indochina Wars.

    Syllabus 8838, Theme III, Learning Outcomes. evaluate the factors that shaped the development of Cold War conflicts in Southeast Asia

Make a guess

In 1963 there were about 16,000 US military advisers in South Vietnam. What do you think happened by 1968?

  1. Over half a million US troops were fighting a ground war.
  2. The advisers had gone home, because the South was winning.
  3. Congress had declared war on North Vietnam.
Show the answer

Over half a million US troops were fighting a ground war.

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave Johnson broad powers, and from 1965 bombing and ground troops grew year by year.

Credibility, the domino theory and fear of a communist victory led the USA from advisers to a large ground war.

Eisenhower sent aid and advisers. Kennedy raised the number of US advisers to about 16,000 by 1963. American leaders believed in the domino theory: if South Vietnam fell, communism would spread across Southeast Asia.

In August 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. It gave President Johnson broad authority to use force in Southeast Asia without a declaration of war.

In March 1965, Johnson began Operation Rolling Thunder, a long bombing campaign against North Vietnam. He also sent the first combat troops. By 1968 more than half a million American troops were in Vietnam.

Johnson had several reasons. In April 1965 he said the USA had a promise to keep. Leaving South Vietnam would shake allies' trust in American promises. This was the argument from credibility. He also feared being blamed for "losing" Vietnam, as Truman had been blamed for China.

Advisers
About 16,000 by 1963.
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
August 1964.
Rolling Thunder
Bombing of the North from March 1965.

Real examples to use

Pleiku, 7 February 1965

An attack on a US base led Johnson to order reprisal raids, which grew into the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign.

Marines at Da Nang, 8 March 1965

The first US ground combat units landed, moving the USA from advising to fighting.

Ia Drang, November 1965

The first major battle between US and North Vietnamese troops showed the North would accept heavy losses.

Worked example: The Gulf of Tonkin, 2 to 7 August 1964

On 2 August 1964, North Vietnamese patrol boats attacked the US destroyer Maddox. A second attack was reported on 4 August, but doubts later grew over whether it took place. On 7 August, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. The House voted for it unanimously, and only two senators voted against.

  1. Trigger: a naval clash, partly unconfirmed, gave Johnson a reason to act.
  2. Power: the resolution let him use force without a declaration of war.
  3. Support: the vote shows that almost all of Congress shared the fear of communism in 1964.
  4. Use: it explains how escalation became possible, but not why Johnson chose it in 1965. For that, look to credibility.

Watch out for this

The USA declared war on North Vietnam in 1964.

Congress never declared war. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave Johnson authority to use force.

Check your understanding

What did the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution do?

  1. It gave the president broad authority to use force in Southeast Asia.
  2. It ordered US advisers home by 1965.
  3. It declared war on North Vietnam and its ally China.
Show the answer

It gave the president broad authority to use force in Southeast Asia.

Right. It became the legal basis for escalation.

Check your understanding

In April 1965 Johnson said the USA had a promise to keep in Vietnam. Which reason for escalation does this show?

  1. Credibility: allies had to believe that American promises would be kept.
  2. Legal duty: the Geneva declaration bound the USA to defend the South.
  3. Economics: American industry needed Vietnam's rice and rubber.
Show the answer

Credibility: allies had to believe that American promises would be kept.

Yes. Johnson argued that leaving Vietnam would shake allies' trust in the USA.

Sources and context

Background reading for this chapter.

  • Johnson explains why Americans are in Vietnam

    Paraphrase of President Lyndon Johnson's address at Johns Hopkins University, 7 April 1965.

  • McNamara recommends more troops

    Paraphrase of a memorandum from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to President Johnson, 20 July 1965.

  • The Geneva final declaration

    Paraphrase of paragraph 7 of the final declaration of the Geneva Conference on Indochina, 20 July 1954, as cabled by the US delegation.

  • Nixon appeals to the silent majority

    Paraphrase of President Richard Nixon's televised address to the nation on the war in Vietnam, 3 November 1969.

  • Eisenhower explains the stakes, 1954

    Extract from President Dwight Eisenhower's news conference of 7 April 1954, answering a question on the strategic importance of Indochina, a month before the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. A US government record in the public domain; text from the American Presidency Project.

  • a Defense official ranks American aims, March 1965

    Extract from "Action for South Vietnam", a paper prepared by John McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Washington, 10 March 1965, two days after the first US Marines landed at Da Nang. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, volume II, document 193. A US government document in the public domain.

  • the Secretary of State on American commitments, July 1965

    Extract from a paper by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Washington, 1 July 1965, written for the President's meeting on whether to send large numbers of combat troops. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, volume III, document 39. A US government document in the public domain.

  • the Under Secretary of State dissents, July 1965

    Extract from "A Compromise Solution for South Viet-Nam", a paper by Under Secretary of State George Ball for the same meeting, Washington, undated (circulated 1 July 1965). The President's security adviser predicted that Johnson would "listen hard to George Ball and then reject his proposal". Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, volume III, document 40. A US government document in the public domain.

  • the Secretary of Defense explains the strategy, November 1965

    Extract from a draft memorandum from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to President Johnson, "Courses of Action in Vietnam", Washington, 3 November 1965. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, volume III, document 189. A US government document in the public domain.

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